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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/944,595	09/04/2001	Naohiko Ichimura	011120	1708
23850	7590	10/16/2003	EXAMINER	
ARMSTRONG, KRATZ, QUINTOS, HANSON & BROOKS, LLP			VORTMAN, ANATOLY	
1725 K STREET, NW			ART UNIT	
SUITE 1000			PAPER NUMBER	
WASHINGTON, DC 20006			2835	

DATE MAILED: 10/16/2003

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

<b>Advisory Action</b>	<b>Application No.</b> 09/944,595	<b>Applicant(s)</b> ICHIMURA, NAOHIKO	
	<b>Examiner</b> Anatoly Vortman	<b>Art Unit</b> 2835	

**--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --**

THE REPLY FILED 09 September 2003 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE. Therefore, further action by the applicant is required to avoid abandonment of this application. A proper reply to a final rejection under 37 CFR 1.113 may only be either: (1) a timely filed amendment which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a timely filed Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee); or (3) a timely filed Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114.

**PERIOD FOR REPLY** [check either a) or b)]

- a) ☒ The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date of the final rejection.
- b) ☐ The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection. ONLY CHECK THIS BOX WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

1. ☐ A Notice of Appeal was filed on \_\_\_\_\_. Appellant's Brief must be filed within the period set forth in 37 CFR 1.192(a), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 1.191(d)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal.
2. ☐ The proposed amendment(s) will not be entered because:
- (a) ☐ they raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);
  - (b) ☐ they raise the issue of new matter (see Note below);
  - (c) ☐ they are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or
  - (d) ☐ they present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_.

3. ☐ Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): \_\_\_\_\_.
4. ☐ Newly proposed or amended claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).
5. ☒ The a) ☐ affidavit, b) ☐ exhibit, or c) ☒ request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the \_\_\_\_\_ application in condition for allowance because: See Continuation Sheet.
6. ☐ The affidavit or exhibit will NOT be considered because it is not directed SOLELY to issues which were newly raised by the Examiner in the final rejection.
7. ☒ For purposes of Appeal, the proposed amendment(s) a) ☒ will not be entered or b) ☐ will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.

The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:

Claim(s) allowed: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) objected to: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) rejected: 1-5.

Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: \_\_\_\_\_.

8. ☐ The proposed drawing correction filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is a) ☐ approved or b) ☐ disapproved by the Examiner.
9. ☐ Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.
10. ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_


*A. Vortman*

Anatoly Vortman  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit: 2835

Continuation of 5. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

Applicant's arguments are not persuasive. The main thrust of the Applicant's arguments is directed to the assertion that there is no motivation to combine references of Hokugoh ('629) and of Willson ('020). The Examiner recognizes that references cannot be arbitrarily combined and that there must be some reason why one skilled in the art would be motivated to make the proposed combination of primary and secondary references. In re Nomiya, 184 USPQ 607 (CCPA 1975). However, there is no requirement that a motivation to make the modification be expressly articulated. The test for combining references is what the combination of disclosures taken as a whole would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re McLaughlin, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). References are evaluated by what they suggest to one versed in the art, rather than by their specific disclosures. In re Bozek, 163 USPQ 545 (CCPA) 1969. In this case, the using spherical ball-shaped members of Willson instead of low-friction member of Hokugoh would definitely suggest to person of ordinary skill in the computer art at the time the invention was made that the combination would be successful. Indeed, it was notoriously known in the computer art at the time the invention was made that rolling friction between two components is lower than sliding friction between the same two components, hence, inherently the two members separated by rolling boll-shaped members (like in Willson) would have lower friction between each other than two members separated by sliding sheet (like in Hokugoh). The Applicant implicitly has admitted the same fact in the arguments by stating: "[It] should also be noted that as shown in Figure 1 of Hokugoh, the sliding sheet only provides sliding action to a light weight liquid crystal display 1 which might weight about 6-7 pounds. In contradistinction, as clearly shown in Figure 2 of Willson, the ball bearings are meant to provide rolling action to a platform 40, a cathode ray tube display and a computer. The weights of these items added together might very well be 60-70 pounds. Therefore, the ball bearing of Willson is designed to provide sliding action to items that weight 10 times more than the sliding sheet 12 of Willson [sic]." Thus, Applicant recognizes that boll-shaped members of Willson would provide lower friction than sliding sheet of Hokugoh. As such, the idea of combining the aforementioned two references would have definitely suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the computer art at the time the invention was made that success of said combination should have been reasonably expected. As decided in In re O'Farrel, 7 USPQ 2d, 1673-1681, Fed. Cir. 1988, obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. Indeed, for many inventions that seem quite obvious, there is no absolute predictability of success until the invention is reduced to practice. There is always at least a possibility of unexpected results, that would then provide an objective basis for showing that the invention, although apparently obvious, was in law nonobvious. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d at 1098, 231 USPQ at 380; Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1461, 221 USPQ 481, 488 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 386-387, 137 USPQ 43, 47-48 (CCPA 1963). For obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103, all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 897, 225 USPQ 645, 651-652 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Clinton, 527 F.2d 1226, 1228, 188 USPQ 365, 367 (CCPA 1976).

Furthermore, regarding the Applicant's arguments that Examiner's rejection is of "hindsight nature" (p.5), it must be recognized that any judgement on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the Applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392; 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

  
**ANATOLY VORTMAN**  
**PRIMARY EXAMINER**